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Abstract—We consider a cooperative device-to-device (D2D)
communication system, where the D2D transmitters (DTs) act
as relays to assist cellular users (CUs) in exchange for the oppor-
tunities to use the licensed spectrum. To reduce the overhead,
we propose a novel two-timescale resource allocation scheme, in
which the pairing between CUs and D2D pairs is decided at a
long timescale and time allocation factor for CU and D2D pair is
determined at a short timescale. Specifically, to characterize the
long-term payoff of each potential CU-D2D pair, we investigate
the optimal cooperation policy to decide the time allocation factor
based on the instantaneous channel state information (CSI). We
prove that the optimal policy is a threshold policy. Since CUs
and D2D pairs are self-interested, they are paired only when they
agree to cooperate mutually. Therefore, to study the behaviors
of CUs and D2D pairs, we formulate the pairing problem as a
matching game, based on the long-term payoff of each possible
pairing. Furthermore, unlike most previous matching model in
D2D networks, we allow transfer between CUs and D2D pairs
to improve the performance. Besides, we propose an algorithm,
which converges to an ǫ-stable matching.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, device-to-device (D2D) communication has been
envisioned as a promising technology to provide a better user
experience. Specifically, proximity D2D users can communi-
cate with each other directly without going through the base
station (BS). Taking the advantages of the physical proximity
of communicating devices, D2D communication can improve
spectrum utilization and energy efficiency, and reduce end-to-
end latency. There are mainly two ways for D2D pairs to share
the cellular spectrum, namely underlay and overlay D2D [1].
In the underlay D2D communication, cellular user (CU) and
D2D pairs share the same spectrum, which incurs interference
to cellular links. In contrast, overlay D2D communication
allows D2D pairs to occupy dedicated spectrum, which could
have been assigned to CUs. Nevertheless, in both underlay
or overlay D2D, the quality of service (QoS) of CUs will be
degraded.
Meanwhile, CUs that are far away from BS, often suffer
from poor channel quality, so that their QoS requirements are
hard to meet. In this context, cooperative relay technology
is thought of as a key technology to tackle this problem.
Compared to fixed relay stations that incur high expenditure,
mobile user relaying is an efficient and flexible solution with
low cost.
Combining D2D communication and cooperative relay
technology, Chen et al. [2] propose a D2D-based cooperative
network, where mobile devices serve as relays for CUs.
However, the work does not consider any incentive mechanism
for mobile devices. In fact, mobile devices, that owned by
selfish users, may be unwilling to act as relays for other
devices without reward. Inspired by the idea of spectrum
leasing [3], authors in [4]–[7] investigate a cooperative D2D
system, where the D2D transmitters (DTs) act as relays to as-
sist CUs in exchange for the opportunities to use the licensed
spectrum. Thus, the QoS of CUs can be guaranteed and D2D
pairs can obtain the transmission opportunities on licensed
spectrum. As a result, a win-win situation can be achieved,
which motivates CUs and D2D pairs to share the spectrum.
However, above works determine the pairing between multiple
CUs and multiple D2D pairs at a short timescale (e.g. at LTE
scheduling time interval of 1ms), which may incur heavy
signaling overhead and thus is not practical in large-scale
networks.
In this paper, we investigate a cooperative D2D communi-
cation system, where CUs and D2D pairs cooperate with each
other via spectrum leasing. Unlike previous works, in order
to reduce the overhead, we propose a two-timescale resource
allocation scheme. In particular, the pairing between multiple
CUs and multiple D2D pairs is determined at a long timescale.
On the other hand, at a short timescale, a cooperation policy
allocates the transmission time for D2D link and cellular link
based on the instantaneous channel state information (CSI).
Under the proposed scheme, only statistic CSI is required for
the pairing problem at the long timescale, while at the short
timescale, the BS acquires only the instantaneous CSI between
every matched CU-D2D pair to decide the transmission time.
As a result, the signal overhead is significantly reduced in
comparison to [4]–[7].
Moreover, we develop a matching game based framework to
solve the two-timescale resource allocation problem. Specifi-
cally, we investigate the optimal cooperation policy for each
D2D pair and its potential CU partner to characterize the
long-term payoff of this potential pairing. In general, CUs
and D2D pairs may be of self-interest [8], and thus they can
only be paired when they agree to cooperate with each other.
The matching game provides an appropriate framework for
such pairing problem with two-sided preferences [9]. This
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
(1 ) / 2
mn
a- (1 ) / 2
mn
a-
mn
a
BS BS BS
CU m CU m CU m
DR nDT n DR nDT n DR nDT n
Fig. 1: Subframe structure for cooperation.
motivates us to formulate the pairing problem at the long
timescale as a one-to-one matching game, based on the long-
term payoff of each potential CU-D2D pair. Furthermore,
unlike previous one-to-one matching models in D2D networks
[7], [10], [11], we propose to allow the transfer between
CUs and D2D pairs as a performance enhancement. Then,
an algorithm is proposed, which converges to an ǫ-stable
matching.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we introduce the system model. We study the optimal
cooperation policy in Section III and investigate the pairing
problem in Section IV. Section V gives numerical results.
Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
Notations: In this paper, E{x} represents the expectation
of x, and I(·) denotes the indication function.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a single cell with a BS denoted by b. Because
mobile devices are more likely to need help due to their
limited power budgets, we focus on uplink resource sharing.
There areM CUs on the cell edge suffering from poor channel
conditions which could not support their QoS. At the same
time, N transmitter-receiver pairs are working in D2D com-
munication mode. There is no dedicated resource allocated for
D2D pairs. As a result, D2D pairs serve as relays for CUs in
exchange for access to the cellular channels. In the following,
we use M = {1, 2, · · · ,M} and N = {1, 2, · · · , N} to
denote the sets of CUs and D2D pairs, respectively.
The time domain is divided into frames of fixed length.
Each frame consists of Ts subframe. The channel gain re-
mains constant in each subframe and changes over different
subframes. Besides, we assume that the channel gains across
different subframes of the same frame are i.i.d. and follow a
known distribution. At the channel occupied by CU m, the
instantaneous channel gains of the cellular link from CU m
to BS, the link from CU m to DT n, the link from DT n to
BS and the D2D link from DT n to D2D receiver (DR) n are
represented as hmmb, h
m
mn, h
m
nb, h
m
nn, respectively.
We assume that each CU is assisted by at most one D2D
pair, since it has been shown that a single relay can achieve the
full diversity gain [12]. As depicted in Fig.1, the normalized
subframe is divided into three phases when D2D pair n
cooperates with CU m.1 The first two phases both last 1−αmn2
and are used for the relay transmission for CUm. Specifically,
CU m broadcasts its data with power Pc to the BS and DT
n at first. Then, DT n forwards the received data to the BS
with power Pd. Besides, the first two phases can also be used
for the cellular link of CU m when the cellular link has better
performance. The last phase lasts αmn and is used for D2D
link, where DT n communicates with DR n with power Pd.
Throughout the paper, we refer to αmn ∈ A , [0, 1] as time
allocation factor for D2D link.
The rate of CU m in the cellular link is
rCm = ln
(
1 +
Pch
m
mb
N0
)
, (1)
where N0 denotes the noise power. In this paper, we take
the decode-and-forward with repetition coding as the relay
scheme. Thus, when CU m is aided by D2D pair n, the rate
of CU m during the first two phases is given by
rRmn =
1
2
min
{
ln
(
1+
Pch
m
mn
N0
)
, ln
(
1+
Pch
m
mb
N0
+
Pdh
m
nb
N0
)}
.
(2)
Since the first two phases can also be used for the cellular
link of CU m, the achieved rate of CU m during the entire
subframe can be represented as
RCmn(αmn) = (1− αmn)max
{
rCm, r
R
mn
}
. (3)
For convenience, we define rCmn , max
{
rCm, r
R
mn
}
.
At the same time, the rate of D2D pair n during the entire
subframe can be given as
RDmn(αmn) = αmn ln
(
1 +
Pdh
m
nn
N0
)
, αmnr
D
mn. (4)
Thus, we have two variables to determine: pairing between
multiple CUs and multiple D2D pairs, and time allocation
factor for each CU-D2D pair. To this end, we propose a
matching game based framework to determine these two
variables at two different timescales. Specifically, based on
the instantaneous CSI, the cooperation policy decides the time
allocation factor for each CU-D2D pair at each subframe (i.e.
at the short timescale). We try to study the optimal cooperation
policy to characterize the long-term payoff of each potential
CU-D2D pair. Then, based on these long-term payoffs, we use
the matching game with transfer to decide the pairing for each
frame (i.e. at the long timescale). In other words, the optimal
cooperation policy is the bridge between two timescales. In the
following two sections, we will study these two subproblems,
respectively.
III. OPTIMAL COOPERATION POLICY
In this section, we investigate the optimal cooperative policy
for each CU-D2D pair. Without loss of generality, we assume
that CU m cooperates with D2D pair n. Define the state
1For simplicity, we assume the transmission direction of D2D pair is fixed
during the entire frame and DT acts as a relay for CUs. In fact, our proposed
scheme can be applied to a more general scenario, where the transmission
direction may change and both D2D devices can be selected as a relay.
rmn , (r
C
mn, r
D
mn), which is determined by the instantaneous
CSI. The set of all the possible states rmn is denoted by Rmn.
The cooperation policy decides the time allocation factor
αmn according to the current state rmn. Mathematically, the
cooperation policy is a function π : Rmn → A. Thus,
given the state rmn, the rate of D2D pair n and CU m
can be represented as π(rmn)r
D
mn and (1− π(rmn)) r
C
mn,
respectively.
he optimal policy aims to maximize the expected rate of the
D2D pair while guaranteeing the QoS of the CU. Therefore,
the optimization problem is formulated as
max
pi
Ermn
{
π(rmn)r
D
mn
}
(5a)
s.t. Ermn
{
(1− π(rmn)) r
C
mn
}
≥ rth, (5b)
where rth is the minimum rate requirement for the CU and
the constraint (5b) is used to guarantee the QoS of the CU.
In fact, if Ts ≫ 1, the objective function (5a) and the left-
hand side of the constraint (5b) are a good approximation of
the average rate of D2D pair n and CU m over Ts subframes,
respectively. In this section, all the expectations are taken over
the random variable rmn. For brevity, we omit the subscript
rmn in the following.
Next, we investigate the structure of the optimal cooperation
policy in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Structure of Optimal Policy): If the problem (5)
is feasible, the optimal policy π∗ is given by
π∗(rmn) =


0, λ∗rCmn > r
d
mn,
α∗, λ∗rCmn = r
d
mn,
1, λ∗rCmn < r
d
mn,
(6)
where
λ∗ = min
{
λ|E{rCmnI(λr
C
mn ≥ r
D
mn)} ≥ rth
}
, (7)
α∗ =
rth −E{rCmnI(λr
C
mn > r
D
mn)}
E{rCmnI(λr
C
mn = r
D
mn)}
. (8)
In fact, λ∗ indicates the minimum threshold which can satisfy
the constraint (5b), and α∗ ensures the equality of (5b).
Proof: We can construct the Lagrangian for the problem
(5) as follows.
L(π, λ) = E
{
π(rmn)r
D
mn
}
+ λ
(
E{(1−π(rmn))r
C
mn}−rth
)
= E
{
π(rmn)(r
D
mn − λr
C
mn)
}
+ λE{rCmn} − λrth,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the con-
straint (5b). For a fixed λ, it is easy to find out that the
following policy πˆλ, which is given in (9), can maximize the
Lagrangian L(π, λ).
πˆλ(rmn) =


0, λrCmn > r
D
mn,
α∗, λrCmn = r
D
mn,
1, λrCmn < r
D
mn.
(9)
The Lagrange dual function can be given by g(λ) =
maxpi L(π, λ). Thus, substituting (9) to g(λ), we have
g(λ) =L(πˆλ, λ)
=E
{
I(λrCmn<r
D
mn)(r
D
mn−λr
C
mn)
}
+λE{rCmn}−λrth.
(10)
In the following, we show that λ∗ minimizes the Lagrange
dual function.
Assuming ∆λ > 0. Then, using (10), we have
g(λ∗ +∆λ)− g(λ∗)
= ∆λE{rCmn} −∆λrth −∆λE
{
rCmnI(λ
∗rCmn<r
D
mn)
}
−E
{
(λ∗+∆λ)rCmnI(λ
∗rCmn≤r
D
mn<(∆λ+λ
∗)rCmn
}
+E
{
rDmnI(λ
∗rCmn≤r
D
mn<(∆λ+λ
∗)rCmn
}
≥ ∆λE{rCmn} −∆λE
{
rCmnI(λ
∗rCmn<r
D
mn)
}
−∆λrth
= ∆λE
{
rCmnI(λ
∗rCmn≥r
D
mn)
}
−∆λrth
≥ 0,
where the last inequality is based on the definition of λ∗.
On the other hand, it is easy to verify that πˆλ∗(rmn) ≤
πˆλ∗−∆λ(rmn). Consequently, using the definition of λ
∗, we
have the following inequalities
g(λ∗)− g(λ∗ −∆λ)
≤ −∆λE
{
πˆλ∗(rmn)r
C
mn
}
+∆λE{rCmn} −∆λrth
= −∆λE{rCmnI(λ
∗rCmn<r
D
mn)}+∆λE{r
C
mn}−∆λrth
= ∆λE{rCmnI(λ
∗rCmn ≥ r
D
mn)} −∆λrth
≤ 0.
Thus, we can conclude that λ∗ is a solution to the dual
problem minλ≥0 g(λ). Therefore, we can have
P ∗
(a)
≤ g(λ∗) = L(π∗, λ∗)
(b)
= E
{
π∗(rmn)r
D
mn
} (c)
≤ P ∗,
where P ∗ is the optimal value of the problem (5). The inequal-
ity (a) is due to the duality gap. The equality (b) is based on
the fact that the policy π∗ can make the constraint (5b) hold
with equality. Since π∗ is a feasible solution to the problem
(5), we can obtain the inequality (c).
Therefore, we can conclude that π∗ is an optimal coopera-
tion policy.
Theorem 1 implies that the optimal policy can be a thresh-
old policy, which makes decisions based on the ratio of rDmn
to rCmn. Besides, this theorem also shows that this optimal
policy will allocate the entire subframe for D2D transmission
(i.e. αmn = 1) or cellular transmission (i.e. αmn = 0) in
most cases. As a result, such optimal policy enables efficient
implementation in practice.
Furthermore, note that the term E
{
rCmnI(λr
C
mn ≥ r
D
mn)
}
increases with increasing λ. Therefore, we can use binary
search to find the threshold λ∗.
At last, we define vmn , E
{
π∗(rmn)r
D
mn
}
if the problem
(5) is feasible. In the case of infeasible, we set vmn = −1.
Thus, vmn can characterize the long-term payoff of D2D pair
n when it cooperates with CUm. Besides, if vmn ≥ 0, we call
D2D pair n being acceptable to CU m. On the contrary, we
call D2D pair n being unacceptable to CU m when vmn < 0.
IV. MATCHING GAME FOR PAIRING PROBLEM
In this section, we study the pairing problem. The assign-
ment is represented as a binary matrix XM×N = [xmn],
where xmn = 1 implies that CU m and D2D pair n are
matched. We aim to maximize the long-term sum rate of D2D
pairs, which can be formulated as the following problem.
max
X
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
xmnvmn (11a)
s.t.
∑
n∈N
xmn ≤ 1, ∀m ∈M, (11b)
∑
m∈M
xmn ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ N , (11c)
xmn ∈ {0, 1}, ∀m ∈M, ∀n ∈ N . (11d)
The constraint (11b) makes sure that each CU is relayed by at
most one DT. Due to the limited battery capacity, each D2D
pair can relay at most one CU [4], which is represented in
the constraint (11c). Note that vmn = −1 when D2D pair n
is unacceptable to CU m. Therefore, the CUs will be only
matched with acceptable D2D pairs.
Originally stemmed from economics [13], the matching
theory provides a framework to tackle the problem of pairing
players in two distinct sets, based on each player’s individual
preference. Since the CUs and D2D pairs are self-interested,
we use the matching game to characterize the cooperations
between CUs and D2D pairs in the pairing problem. More-
over, Theorem 1 implies that the CU is indifferent over
the acceptable D2D pairs while D2D pair may have strict
preference over CUs. Therefore, we allow transfer between
D2D pairs and CUs to improve the performance. Such model
is called matching game with transfer [9] and also referred as
to assignment game [13]. Specifically, each CU has a price
charged to its matched partner. Intuitively, the price of one
CU indicates the willingness of D2D pairs to cooperate with
that CU.
Definition 1: A one-to-one mapping µ is a function from
M∪N to M∪N ∪ {0} such that µ(m) = n if and only
if µ(n) = m, and µ(m) ∈ M ∪ {0}, µ(n) ∈ N ∪ {0} for
∀m ∈ M, ∀n ∈ N .
Note that µ(x) = 0 means that the user x is unmatched
in µ. The above definition implies that a one-to-one mapping
matches a user on one side to the one on the other side unless
the user is unmatched. Thus, a mapping µ can define a feasible
solution to the problem (11). Next, we will introduce the price
into the matching model.
Definition 2: A matching is defined as Φ = (µ,p), where
µ is a one-to-one mapping, p = (p1, p2, · · · , pM ) is the price
vector of CUs and pm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈M. Moreover, if µ(m) = 0,
then pm = 0.
We denote the utilities of CU m and D2D pair n as θm
and δn, respectively. Thus, given a matching Φ = (µ,p), θm
and δn can be represented as
θm(Φ) = pm, (12)
δn(Φ) = vµ(n)n − pµ(n). (13)
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to Find ǫ-stable Matching
1: Set t = 1, pm = βtm = 0, µ
0(m) = 0,∀m ∈M;
D2D Pairs’ Proposals:
2: Broadcast the price requirement vector βt = (βt
1
, βt
2
, · · · , βt
M
);
3: for each unmatched D2D pair n ∈ N do
4: Determine its demand m = Dn(βt);
5: Ifm 6= 0, D2D pair n proposes to CUm (gtmn = 1). Otherwise, D2D
pair n does not proposes (gtmn = 0,∀m ∈ M) and µ
t(n) = 0;
6: end for
CUs’ Decision Making:
7: for Each CU m ∈M do
8: if
∑
n∈N g
t
mn=0,
∑
n∈N g
t−1
mn > 0 and µ(m) = 0 then
9: Set µt(m) = n∗, where n∗ = random({n|gt−1mn =1});
10: Set pm = β
t−1
m and β
t+1
m = β
t
m;
11: Set gt
m∗n∗
= 0, where m∗ = Dn∗ (β
t);
12: end if
13: end for
14: for Each CU m ∈M do
15: if
∑
n∈N
gtmn=1, and µ
t−1
m =0 or pm<β
t
m are satisfied then
16: Set µt(m) = n∗, where gt
mn∗
= 1;
17: Set pm = βtm and β
t+1
m = β
t
m;
18: else if
∑
n∈N g
t
mn ≥ 1 then
19: Set µt(m) = 0;
20: If n 6=0 and pm=βtm where n=µ
t−1(m), set gtmn=1;
21: Set βt+1m = β
t
m + ǫ;
22: else
23: Set βt+1m = β
t
m;
24: end if
25: end for
26: t← t+ 1;
27: Go to step 3 until there is no proposal in current loop.
Here, we let p0 = 0 and v0n = 0, ∀n ∈ N for convenience.
In the matching theory, the concept of stability is important.
On the other hand, since the price is usually quantized
for exchange between CUs and D2D pairs in practical, we
introduce the ǫ-stable matching as follows.
Definition 3: Given ǫ ≥ 0, a matching Φ is ǫ-stable, if and
only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(1) θm(Φ) ≥ 0, δn(Φ) ≥ 0, for ∀m ∈ M, ∀n ∈ N ;
(2) θm(Φ) + δn(Φ) ≥ vmn − ǫ, for ∀m ∈M, ∀n ∈ N .
The condition (1) is called individual rationality condition and
reflects that a user may remain unmatched if the cooperation is
not beneficial. Condition (2) implies that there is no CU-D2D
pair (m,n) such that they can form a new matching, where
both of them can increase their utilities and one of them can
improve its utility by at least ǫ.
Algorithm 1 is proposed to find an ǫ-stable matching. In the
following, we give a brief description of the algorithm during
t-th iteration.
At first, the price requirement vector βt will be broadcast,
and βtm represents the minimum price has to pay if D2D pair
wants to propose to CU m at the current iteration. Then, each
unmatched D2D pair n selects its favorite CU according to
Dn(β
t), where the demand function is represented as
Dn(β
t) =
{
arg max
m∈M
(vmn − βtm), max
m∈M
(vmn − βtm) ≥ 0,
0, otherwise.
(14)
In the CUs’ decision making stage, the CUs decide if they
want to match with the D2D pairs. There are four cases
for each CU m. The first case (step 8-12) is that CU m
is unmatched and receives no proposals after increasing its
price requirement, but in the previous iteration, has received
proposals from multiple D2D pairs. Then, CU m will select
randomly one of those D2D pairs to be matched with and set
the price as pm = β
t−1
m . The second case (step 15-17) is that
CU m receives one proposal, and meanwhile, it is unmatched
or matched with the price pm < β
t
m. In other words, only one
D2D pair wants to be matched with CU m with the price βtm.
As a result, CU m will be matched with that D2D pair and
set the price as pm = β
t
m. The third case (step 18-21) is that
there are multiple D2D pairs (including the current partner
of CU m) wanting to be matched with CU m with the price
βtm. Then, CU m will increase its price requirement by ǫ and
become unmatched, where ǫ > 0 is the price-step. In the last
case (step 23), CU m will remain the price requirement and
do nothing else. The convergence of Algorithm 1 is given in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The Algorithm 1 converges to an ǫ-stable
matching.
Proof: At first, we show that the algorithm converges to a
matching. Note that βtm is non-decreasing. Moreover, it can be
found that βtm ≤ ǫ+maxn∈N vmn. Therefore, the algorithm
will converge in finite steps. Use Φ = (µ,p) to denote the
final result. It is easy to verify that once a CU has received
a proposal, the CU will have a partner in µ. Thus, the prices
of the CUs unmatched in µ are zero. Therefore, (µ,p) is a
matching.
In the following, we prove that (µ,p) is ǫ-stable by
contradiction.
Suppose there exists a CU-D2D pair (m,n) such that θm+
δn < vmn− ǫ. Assume µ(m) = n
′ and µ(n) = m′. Thus, we
can find a price p′ such that p′ ≥ pm + ǫ and vmn − p′ >
vm′n − pm′ . So, we have
vmn − pm > vmn − p
′ > vm′n − pm′ . (15)
According to the algorithm, (15) implies that D2D pair n
must have proposed to CU m. Therefore, there must exist
an iteration, denoted by τ -th iteration, where the first case
happens for CU m. Specifically, CU m receives multiple
proposals with βτ−1m = pm at (τ−1)-th iteration, and receives
no proposal with βτm = pm+ ǫ at τ -th iteration. Furthermore,
no D2D pairs propose to CU m afterward. As a result, we
have the following inequalities
vmn − p
′ ≤ vmn − β
τ
m < vm′n − pm′ , (16)
which is inconsistent with (15).
Besides, it is easy to verify (µ,p) satisfies the individual
rationality condition. Therefore, we can conclude that (µ,p)
is ǫ-stable.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, the performance of the proposed scheme is
investigated through simulations. The instantaneous channel
TABLE I: Configuration Parameters
Parameters Value
Power noise (N0) -100 dBm
Transmit power of CU (Pc) 20 mW
Transmit power of DT (Pd) 20 mW
Distance of D2D link Uniformly distributed in [10, 30] m
Minimum rate requirement (rth) 1.8 bps/Hz
Price-step (ǫ) 1
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Fig. 2: The effective average utilities of D2D pairs and CUs versus
the number of D2D pairs, where M = 15.
gain used in the simulation is h = ηL−γ , where η is the
fast-fading gain with exponential distribution, γ = 4 is the
pathloss exponent and L is the distance between transmitter
and receiver. For simulation, we consider the scenario where
the BS is deployed in the cell center while the radius of the
cell is set to 500 m. The CUs are distributed uniformly at the
cell edge. Meanwhile, the D2D pairs are uniformly distributed
in the area with a distance of 200 m to 400 m from the BS.
Other configuration parameters are given in Table.I.
At first, we investigate the property of our scheme. Fig.2
presents the effective average utilities (EAU) of CUs and D2D
pairs versus the number of D2D pairs. The EAU of CUs
is defined as EAU = Sum of CUs’ utilities
Number of matched CUs
. The EAU of D2D
pairs can be defined in a similar way. It can be observed
that with the increasing number of D2D pairs, the EAU of
CUs increases while the EAU of D2D pairs decreases. The
rationale behind this is that when N is small, there is a strong
competition among CUs to acquire the relay service from D2D
pairs. Therefore, the prices of CUs are low and each matched
D2D pair has high utility. In comparison, when there is a large
number of D2D pairs, the available CUs become a scarce
resource. As a result, each D2D pair has to pay a higher price
for the transmission opportunities on the cellular channels.
Next, to evaluate the performance gain of the proposed
scheme, we compare it with the following schemes: i) the
optimal scheme provides the optimal solution to the problem
(11); ii) the matching without transfer scheme adopts the
matching game without transfer to solve the pairing problem
(11), i.e. the prices of CUs are zero; iii) the random scheme
matches the D2D pairs and CUs randomly. The comparison
results are provided in Fig.3 and Fig.4.
In Fig.3, we compare the performance of different schemes
in terms of the sum rate of D2D pairs. This figure shows
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Fig. 3: The sum rate of D2D pairs with different schemes versus the
number of D2D pairs, where M = 15.
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Fig. 4: The outage percentage of CUs with different schemes versus
the number of D2D pairs, where M = 15.
that the proposed scheme achieves near-optimal performance.
Besides, owning to allowing transfer between CUs and D2D
pairs, the proposed scheme outperforms the matching without
transfer scheme, especially in the large N region. It also can
be observed that the gain is small in the small N region. This
is due to the fact the prices of CUs are close to zero when
N is small (which is consistent with the results in Fig.2).
Thus, these two schemes are almost the same in this situation.
Moreover, the matching without transfer scheme only matches
the CUs with their acceptable partners. Therefore, this scheme
can obtain better performance than the random scheme.
Fig.4 presents the outage percentage of CUs under different
schemes, and the outage refers to the case where the rate
requirement of a CU is not satisfied. Compared with the
random scheme, the rest three schemes achieve significantly
better performance. In particular, these three schemes have a
similar outage percentage. The explanation is as follows. The
outage never happens if each CU is matched with acceptable
D2D pairs. Since all the three schemes only match the CUs
with their acceptable D2D pairs, the price has little impact
on the outage percentage. Furthermore, when N ≥ 20, the
outage percentage of our scheme is close to zero. It implies
that our scheme improves the performance of CUs greatly. On
the contrary, the outage percentage of the random scheme is
larger than 60%, which indicates that it is essential to have
an efficient pairing between CUs and D2D pairs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated a cooperative D2D
communication system, where D2D pairs and CUs cooperate
with each other via spectrum leasing. We have provided a low-
overhead design for the system by proposing a two-timescale
resource allocation scheme, in which the pairing between
CUs and D2D pairs is decided at the long timescale and
time allocation factor is determined at the short timescale.
Specifically, to characterize the long-term payoff of each
potential CU-D2D pair, we investigate the optimal cooperation
policy to decide the time allocation factor. Based on these
long-term payoffs, we use the matching game with transfer to
solve the pairing problem. The simulation results confirm the
performance gain of the proposed scheme.
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